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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LYNDA F JONES,
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Plaintiff-Appellee
vs

Oral Argument Requested

ALAN D JONES,

Case No. 2004-0192CA

Defendant-Appellant

DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES
The Plaintiff-Appellee is Lynda F Jones, a natural
person. The Defendant-Appellant is Alan D Jones, a
natural person. To enable the Court to ascertain the
former spousal roles of the parties, the first names of
the parties will be frequently used herein: ALAN for
former husband, LYNDA for former wife, so as to avoid
confusion
legalistic

which

may

terms

arise
applied

from
to

the

traditional

party-litigants,

particularly in this "petition to modify" context.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

LYNDA F JONES,
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Plaintiff-Appellee
vs

Oral Argument Requested

ALAN D JONES,

Case No. 2004-0192CA

Defendant-Appellant

ALAN

JONES

[hereinafter

"ALAN"]

presents

the

following "rebuttal" and "response" arguments to those
raised in LYNDA JONES' [hereinafter "LYNDA"] BRIEF.

LYNDA'S FINANCIAL NEEDS
AND ALAN'S ABILITY TO PAY
LYNDA

asserts

[Pages

15-16

of

her

BRIEF]

satisfactory compliance with the Jones vs Jones, 770
P. 2d 1072 (Utah Supreme Court 1985) criteria for an
alimony

award.

In

Jones

the

Utah

Supreme

Court

identified the three criteria of primary concern in an
alimony award, thus:
This Court has described the purpose of
alimony: " [Tlhe most important function of
alimony is to provide support for the wife as
nearly as possible at the standard of living
she enjoyed during marriage, and to prevent
the wife from becoming a public charge."
English v. English, 565 P.2d at 411. With
this purpose in mind, the Court in English
articulated three factors that must be
considered in fixing a reasonable alimony
award:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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[1] the financial
needs of the wife;

conditions and

[2] the ability of the wife to
produce a sufficient income for
herself; and
[3] the ability of the husband to
provide support.
Id. at 411-12 (citations omitted). See also
Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 587 P.2d 144, 147
(1978); Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d
1218, 1223 (1980). Nowhere in the trial
court's memorandum decision, its findings of
fact, or its statements made on the record at
the conclusion of the hearing is there any
indication that the court analyzed the
circumstances of the parties in light of these
three factors. And our attempt to perform
this analysis through a review of the record
evidence compels us to conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in fixing the
alimony award.
770 P.2d at 1075. Emphasis added.
The foregoing "judicial" standards (i.e. "factors")
have been legislatively incorporated into the statute
applicable to alimony awards, namely Section 3 0-35(a) (7) , Utah Code (which includes additional criteria,
not necessarily pertinent to this appeal) . [The statute
avoids the gender-based "husband" and "wife" labels and
standards which are facially unconstitutional.]
a.

LYNDA7S financial needs.
As an appendix [pp. A-19 thru A-22 to her BRIEF] ,

LYNDA included her financial declaration which was
introduced as evidence before the District Court at the
July 2003 trial. Condensed to its operative "core", the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

sworn document has the following significant features:
Gross monthly income:

$4,250.00

Less: monthly deductions:

1,187.72

Net Monthly Income:

$3,062.28

Monthly expenses:

$3,367.00

Facially, LYNDA'S expenses are a mere $305 in excess of
her claimed "income". However, upon cross-examination
concerning her "monthly deductions", LYNDA testified
that she received a "tax refund" of approximately $2200
[Testimony of Lynda Jones. TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS,
14 August 2003, pp. 53-54: "$1861" federal refund and
"$407" state, for a total of $2268) .] When that amount
[$2268] is divided by twelve (months) , that's in excess
of $171 per month to be deducted from the "deductions"
she's claimed, thus to be "added to" (and increasing)
her "net monthly income
$3,233

(by that $171+ amount) , to

almost within $150 of her claimed "monthly

expenses" [of #3,367].
During ALAN'S cross-examination of LYNDA'S claimed
(and sworn, under oath) "monthly expenses" as contained
within her "FINANCIAL DECLARATION

TRIAL EXHIBIT #9",

the District Court abandoned its "neutral" role as an
impartial fact-finder and became almost an advocate for
LYNDA. The TRANSCRIPT of the 14 August 2003 reflects
the following, beginning with the on-going "crossDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

examination" questioning

(by Mr Homer, counsel for

ALAN):
Question (by Homer) :

And the . . .

THE COURT: And you've allotted nothing for
clothing; is that correct?
Ms JONES:
No, because when I need clothes
I usually charge them and that's why I have
credit card bills, and you know, I am a
professional person. I am required to dress,
you know, appropriately for that position.

(

THE COURT:
So you do buy clothes, but you
didn't put clothes in that column. What do you
think you spend per month in clothing?
MS. JONES:

I'd say $1,000 a year.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS, pages 57, line 23, through
page 58, line 8. Emphasis added.
The

foregoing

"sworn

testimony"

evidence

is

significant, for two reasons:
First, LYNDA'S "monthly" clothing "expense" is
less than $85 per month

($1000 per year,

divided by twelve months).
Secondly, the "clothing expense" is apparently

<

"double-counted" in the $975 per month "credit
card" expense described below.
Ultimately, the COURT
as

a neutral

evidence

departing again from its role

fact-finder

hearing

the

testimonial

again assumed the role of an advocate and
i

raised the "clothing expense" to $3 00 per month. The
Court's written "finding" on this item is thus:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8. This Court finds that the Petitioner's
attested unmet financial need of $300.00 per
month is understated. By taking into account
the reasonable amount of expenses associated
with clothing and dry-cleaning, this Court
finds that the petitioner's unmet financial
needs are closer to $500.00 per month.
RECORD at pp. 282-283. FINDINGS OF FACT. Emphasis
added.

Not

only

does

this

evidence

ignore

the

arithmetic calculation (to "add back in" as "income"
the

$171+

excessively

taken

as

an

income

tax

withholding) , but "double-counts" the clothing expense,
which the witness testified were/had been charged
against her credit cards.
The monthly expenses in the FINANCIAL DECLARATION-EXHIBIT

#9

include

notwithstanding

an

amount

the word

of

$975.00,

which

"specify", weren't. Upon

cross-examination by ALAN's counsel, LYNDA acknowledged
that such payments were for "credit card payments", for
indebtednesses

incurred

after

ALAN'S

unemployment

terminated the alimony revenue she had received.
Examined in the long-run, several observations and
conclusions are warranted:
First, given the fact that LYNDA received
"advanced warning" of ALAN' s economic plight--months before he had attempted to work with
her to "settle out" the perpetual alimony
claims, and she wouldn't

LYNDA runs out and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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runs up (claimed) a large "credit card bill"
for undisclosed expenses. [See TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS, 14 August 2003, pages 54-55, for
LYNDA'S testimony on this subject.]

Coupled

with the fact that in November 2000 she was
"on

notice"

that

the

alimony

award

was

requested by ALAN to go to zero (for "material
change of circumstances" reasons resisted by
LYNDA but nevertheless "found" by the Court
and now conceded by LYNDA). Thus, unless she
ran up the

$30,000

in the two months

September 2000 and October 2000

before she

was "served" with the "modification" petition
(and her testimony was not that she had done
so in the two-month period, but had taken a
couple years to do so), the almost $1000 per
month amount ought to be deducted from her
monthly expenses. However, in the context of
a permanent alimony setting, to utilize the
$975 amount would be unfair and
judicial

vernacular

in the

"inequitable":

ALAN

ought not be saddled with permanent, ongoing
"monthly alimony" based upon (1) obligations
so unreasonably incurred, and (2) obligations
which

at $975 per month

will be "paid off"

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(because the $30,000 in credit card debt will
be paid down to zero), and lastly (3) LYNDA
has

been

awarded

albeit

improperly

for/with a "judgment" for $30,000+ for the
"unpaid alimony" for those same expenses which
she incurred when ALAN wasn't paying. In like
fashion, if believed she's "going in the hole"
at the rate of $200 per month each month, most
people would "cut back" somewhere: one either
reduce the incurring of new expenses or one
reduces the outgoing expenses. This would be
particularly the case when LYNDA, by then
having been so served with the "modification
petition" was "on notice" the alimony might
drop, and drop significantly, particularly in
light of her own $40,000 annualized income.
In

similar

fashion,

LYNDA

claims

a

monthly "mortgage payment" of $14 00 + , which in
today's

"reduced

interest

marketplace"

purchases a whole lot of house! A "new" house
acquired post-divorce: LYNDA arguably not only
is "doing quite well" (particularly vis-a-vis
ALAN, who doesn't even have his own house),
but has ostensibly "moved up", as she does not
live in the former marital residence. That the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"mortgage" might be re-financed (and/or some
day "paid off") has particular bearing on
LYNDA's claimed "needs".
Thus, LYNDA'S actual expenses

rather than being

merely a couple hundred dollars "in the hole"

when

properly understood are not merely a "negative $200"
compared to monthly revenues

but rather are, in the

long-term, hundreds and hundreds of dollars "ahead" of
her income.
b.

LYNDA'S ability to support herself.
LYNDA earns $5 0,000 per year; ALAN earns about

$16,000-17,000.

She's

certainly

able

to

support

herself. She is in no danger of becoming a "public
charge".
Obviously, everyone

given the opportunity

can

have "needs" (actually "wants", disguised as "needs" or
described as "expenses", many of which are reflective
of

discretionary

choices).

Everyone,

given

the

opportunity, can spend as much money as they have,
particularly when the spender
alimony situation
c.

as the case in an

doesn't have to "earn it".

ALAN'S ability to provide support.
ALAN disagree's vigorously with LYNDA'S and the

District Court's characterization that he "voluntarily
terminated"

his

employment

(as

a

District

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Sales

Manager, with Lawson Fasteners) and the implications
thereof. That he voluntarily terminated his employment
IS TRUE. What is incorrect and misleading

is the

inference LYNDA (and, arguably, the District Court)
would draw that ALAN voluntarily quit is $70,000 per
year position. He didn't. ALAN testified that at the
time he actually quit [during the spring or summer of
2000] he was facing a situation where, as a result of
the corporate pay-scale re-structuring, his "earnings"
would decrease from the $60, 000-to-$70, 000 range, to an
annualized

amount in the $23,000-range. While the

District Court didn't want to believe the $23,000
annualized

earning

ALAN

was

anticipating,

it

is

nevertheless the truth. And the District Court is
certainly not at liberty to disregard

such sworn

testimony. [ALAN wouldn't have documentary evidence of
that amount, because he didn't stick around with Lawson
waiting to earn that significantly diminished amount.]
As noted previously in ALAN'S opening BRIEF, it
would have been unreasonable and unrealistic

given

the fact that he had the "alimony obligation" (as it
has been referred to, although not necessarily with
that exact phrasing) of $16,800 per year

that he

would be expected to sustain that "alimony obligation"
(District Court's frequently-utilized term) when his
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

entire "takehome" pay (income of $23k, less withholding
deductions for income taxes, etc.) would likely be not
too much more than the $16,800 he was expected to be
paying

LYNDA

reasonable

in

alimony!

for ALAN

Thus,

it

to leave his

was

entirely

employment

with

Lawson. [In similar vein, it would be interesting
hypothetically

to ascertain how the District Court

would have handled ALAN'S employment, at Lawson, at the
$23,000 annual earnings amount. One can safely assume
that LYNDA
earnings

wanting $16,800 per year from his $16k
would want the same amount from his $23k

annual earnings!]
To

characterize

ALAN'S

situation

"underemployment" as the Court does
LYNDA'S BRIEF, quoting the Court

as

as recited by

evidences a judicial

misunderstanding of the facts and a disregard of the
legal standards governing the alimony award: arguably
bordering on an "abuse of discretion". Indeed, the
District Court's continuing characterization of the
"voluntary quit" (undersigned's terminology) situation,
while simultaneously ignoring the economic realities of
the situation, and the District Court's pre-occupation
with the "obligations" analysis

with its result that

ALAN cannot move to Montana, because there are no sales
manager jobs in that State (not that the District Court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

expressly said it that way, but ALAN is nevertheless
penalized

for

having

done

so,

without

checking

beforehand) . As the issue is (was) seemingly framed by
the District Court, ALAN is judicially condemned if he
does quit and/or judicially condemned if he doesn't
(quit and look for something better) . At times, the
District Court was seemingly almost indignant over the
concept

that

ALAN,

having

"obligations"

(to pay

alimony) , would terminate his employment with Lawson
which was proposing to pay him one-third of what he had
been earning, but for the same quantity of work as
before. [Who wouldn't, in those circumstances, likewise
quit?] Indeed, it is practically impossible to avoid
such a judicial "challenge" to the Court's "authority"
(to order the payment of the alimony) , or minimally the
appearance of such a challenge, given the fact that
LYNDA had filed the several "order to show cause"
proceedings for the alleged "contempt" arising from
ALAN's failure to pay. Initially, the District Court
faced with ALAN'S evidence that it was physically and
financially impossible for him to pay the $1600 per
month as originally ordered

allowed him to pay $100

per month. RECORD at page 207.
And

lastly, given ALAN'S

"personal" situation

(life-threatening health condition, albeit temporary,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

coupled with his advanced age
ought to be able

mid-50s) , perhaps he

(and judicially allowed, short of

actual "retirement") to "slow down" and perhaps live a
little "better", if not longer. Seemingly, LYNDA (and
perhaps even the District Court) would apparently just
as easily see ALAN "die in the harness" as he struggled
to

fulfill

his

economic

"obligation"

to

pay

the

alimony.
In describing the foregoing, the District Court's
"findings" are illuminating, to say the least. The
FINDINGS provide, in relevant part:
4. This Court finds that the Respondent's
current under-employment is not necessitated
by any health concerns or physical impediments
of the Respondent. To the contrary, the
Respondent testified at trial that he was
currently in good health. This Court agrees
with the contention of Respondent's counsel
that the Respondent left Lawson simply because
he intended to earn less money.
5. This Court finds that while a person is
free to change careers or choose to earn less
money; this voluntary act does not obviate
one's alimony obligation. Therefore, this
Court will impute to the Respondent the full
amount of income represented by his earning
history prior to his voluntary departure from
Lawson Products.
6.
In contrast to the Respondent's voluntary
choice to leave his previous employment to
earn less money, the Petitioner has steadily
progressed in her career and now earns
approximately double of what she earned at the
time of the Decree of Divorce. This Court
further finds it ironic that it is the fruits
of the Petitioner's hard work and diligence
that now provide the sole legal basis for the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Respondent to claim a change of circumstance
and seek to modify his alimony obligation.
7. This Court finds that, using the
Petitioner's reasonable financial needs as a
reference point, that the Petitioner is
entitled to an amount of alimony that will
meet her unmet financial needs.
8. This Court finds that the Petitioner's
attested unmet financial need of $300.00 per
month is understated. By taking into account
the reasonable amount of expenses associated
with clothing and dry-cleaning, this Court
finds that the petitioner's unmet financial
needs are closer to $500.00 per month.
FINDINGS OF FACT. RECORD at pp. 282-283. Emphasis
added.
The

Court's

FINDING

#4

(last

sentence)

is

misleading and a "play on words": of course ALAN left
Lawson, and arguably with the result that he might earn
less money. But ALAN wasn't going to continue to work
for Lawson (at $23k per year, gross earnings), doing
the same job for which he was formerly paid in the $60s
and 70s (thousands) for previously! Particularly when
he had the $16,800
Court's

why

shouldn't he be able to choose to earn less? LYNDA

at

$40,000

per

facing

year

was

him.

(District

Secondly,

then

terminology)

"alimony obligation"

certainly

supporting

herself adequately.
The Court's FINDING #6 (Court "finds it ironic"
that Lynda's earnings . . .) "misses the mark". The
District Court's analysis

LYNDA'S

"hard work and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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diligence"
own

misses the point: she, for reasons of her

choosing,

perhaps

skill,

luck,

good

fortune,

smarts, whatever, is capable of earning $50,000. And
does so! [LYNDA isn't earning $50k working day-andnight, at three jobs, to make ends meet; she does so at
a single job with salaried position.] So the judicial
inquiry ought to be focused upon the judicial/statutory
phrasing: "the ability of the recipient spouse to
provide adequate income herself" (or wording to that
effect) .
In light of the foregoing evidence and arguments
which can be raised
analyze

the

(i.e. failure to realistically

parties'

individualized

situations,

regardless of the perceived causes of those situation),
the

District

Court's

"Findings"

border

on

being

insufficient. See, for example, Hall vs Hall, 858 P. 2d
1018 (Utah App 1993) [trial court abuses its discretion
in determining financial interests of divorced parties
when it fails to enter specific, detailed findings
supporting its financial determinations; findings are
adequate only if they are sufficiently detailed and
include enough subsidiary facts to disclose steps by
which ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached]; Williamson vs Williamson, 1999 UT App 219,
983 P.2d 1103 (1999) [trial court must make findings of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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fact based on factors enumerated in statute governing
proceeding to modify divorce decree]; and Willey vs
Willey, 866 P.2d 547 (Utah App 1993) [trial court must
make sufficiently detailed findings on each of the
governing factors to enable reviewing court to insure
the

trial

court's

discretionary

determination was

rationally based upon those factors] .
In the foregoing, the District Court

whether or

not ALAN stayed with Lawson (at $23k annually) or not--made no "finding" as to the effect upon ALAN (i.e. his
"ability to provide support"). As noted in ALAN'S
opening BRIEF, the "equitable" comparison of the two
parties' relative incomes would nevertheless prove to
be "inequitable", even visibly so: ALAN at $23k, LYNDA
at $50k, and he's expected ("obligated") to give her
$6k (or $16k) , with the resultant disparity (even if he
gives her only $6k):
LYNDA has $5 6k in
including alimony.

annualized

"income",

ALAN
has
$17k
in
annualized
albeit
"imputed"
"income", because
the Court
ignored the unrebutted testimony: ALAN earns
what he earns, regardless of the "subjective"
reasons therefor.
II
TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO RENDER JUDGMENT
(I.E. MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY) RETROACTIVELY
CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION
Ex-wife LYNDA advances [see Page 20 et seq of her
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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BRIEF] a disingenuous and improperly-analyzed argument
with respect to the "retroactivity" of the alimony
modification. LYNDA claims that the trial court has
"discretion" to render the award "retroactive" (to time
of filing)

or not. This analysis

statutory principles
albeit incorrectly
Section

contradicts

the

which LYNDA purports to analyze,
applicable to the situation.

78-45-9.4(4),

Utah

Code, provides

in

relevant part:
(4) A child or spousal support payment made
under a child support order may be modified
with respect to any period during which a
modification is pending, but only from the
date of service of the pleading on the
obligee, if the obligor is the petitioner, or
on the obligor, if the obligee is the
petitioner. If the tribunal orders that the
support should be modified, the effective date
of the modification shall be the month
following service on the parent whose support
is affected. Once the tribunal determines that
a modification is appropriate, the tribunal
shall order a judgment be entered for any
difference in the original order and the
modified amount for the period from the
service of the pleading until the final order
of modification is entered.
Emphasis added.
That the foregoing provisions are applicable
notwithstanding LYNDA's assertions to the contrary
the

situation

at

hand

(i.e. ALAN's

petition

modification) arises from several factors:
1.

First, the statute utilizes the phrase

"spousal support", and that is exactly what we
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to
for

have here. [To follow LYNDA'S arguments, the
Court would have to ignore the legislativelyselected term and, essentially, "write the
term out" of the statute. The judicial branch
has neither that responsibility nor the power
to do so. Judges must interpret the law as
written.

In

construing

presumed

that

specific

wording

the

statutes,

Legislature

advisedly,

it

chose

and

is
the

intended

meaning and effect be given to each word
selected.
2.

Secondly, that the provisions of Section

78-45-9.4(4),

Utah

Code,

apply

to

the

situation at hand ("modification" of "spousal
support") arises and flows from the definition
of "child support order", as "defined" in
Section 78-45-2(8), Utah Code, thus:
(8) "Child
support
order"
or
"support order" means a judgment,
decree, or order of a tribunal
whether interlocutory or final,
whether or not prospectively or
retroactively modifiable, whether
incidental to a proceeding for
divorce,
judicial
or
legal
separation, separate maintenance,
paternity,
guardianship,
civil
protection, or otherwise which:
(a) e s t a b l i s h e s
or
modifies child support; .
Emphasis added. From the foregoing text, the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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following analysis is pertinent:
First, the original [19 92] Divorce
Decree provided for "child support",
thus bringing the parties' situation
within the ambit of the phrasing
"child

support

order"

and

the

application of Section 7 8-45-9.4(4) .
That the situation is more extensive
than

merely

"child

support"

is

confirmed not only by the phrase
"spousal

support" as utilized in

Section 78-45-9.4(4), Utah Code, as
described

above, as

well

as the

selected statutory terms describing
"divorce,

judicial

separation,

[and]

or

legal

separate

maintenance" which apply to spouse
or

ex-spouse

(or

soon-to-be

ex-

spouse) situations.
Secondly, the District Court, not only "found"
the

pertinent

circumstances"

"material

change

of

(which LYNDA now, finally,

acknowledges), but

actually

"ordered"

the

judicial "modification" of the alimony award.
The essential statutory criteria are each
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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individually satisfied.
Factually, ALAN filed his petition for modification
in October 2000; the petition was "served" upon LYNDA
in November 2000. Thus, under the provisions of Section
78-45-9.4(4), the petition for "modification", when
ultimately granted, should have been retroactive to
December 2000

the month immediately following the

month in which LYNDA was served with the "petition for
modification". Thus, from December 2000 forward, the
"alimony" award should have been the $500 per month the
Court ultimately ordered.1 Thus, the District Court's
award of the $30,000 or so "judgment" [May 2003; RECORD
at 181] against ALAN and arising from and/or within the
"order to show cause proceedings" which the Court
entertained

simultaneously with

the

"modification"

proceeding is, for these reasons alone, invalid as
being in conflict with the statute, and must be set
aside. The District Court, on this narrow issue, has NO
"discretion", because the statute gives the judge no
discretion: that statute says "shall", and that term is
consistently recognized to be MANDATORY!

x

That ALAN asserts in this paragraph "the alimony
should have been the $500 amount" ultimately decreed by
the District
Court
(in 2003) should not be
improvidently construed to be an abandonment of ALAN'S
global position that the alimony should be even less,
perhaps zero, based upon LYNDA'S "needs" (or non-needs,
as the Digitized
situation
actually is).
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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In similar fashion, the "retroactivity" of the
entitlement

is

premised

upon

widespread

judicial

|

acceptance that such "petitions for modification" are
effective

"retroactively"

(i.e.

to

the

date

of

"filing"

or more accurately, the date of service upon

the responding ex-spouse) ; that judicial acceptance
arises from the correct interpretation and application
of Section 78-45-9.4(4), Utah Code, as analyzed above.
Likewise, the specific "facts" material to the
District Court's determination [i.e. "material change
of circumstance" pertinent to ALAN'S diminished income
(i.e. "ability of payor spouse to provide alimony
support")

as

well

as

LYNDA'S

claimed

"need"

for

<

continuing alimony support] were essentially unchanged
during the entirety of the "modification" proceeding.
With

respect

essentially
(approximately

to ALAN'S
reduced
$16,000

income,

to

the

per year)

his

"income"

was

per

hour

$8.00
range

and

that

doesn't reflect those periods of time when he was

<

hospitalized with a bleeding esophagus, in a comatose
condition for days, and

"under doctor's order" to

refrain from working for a year following discharge
from the hospital
obligated,

which "doctor's orders" he was

notwithstanding

the

continuing

jeopardization of his heath, to disregard. [See RECORD
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

at 196: physician's written "No work for 12 months"
directive. Emphasis in original document.]

If the

"modification" of the alimony amount is justified
which

it

certainly

is

prospectively

(from

2003

forward), by reason of ALAN'S inability to provide
support at the former amount, then the "inability"
should likewise extend "retroactively" back to the date
of the service of the "petition to modify" upon LYNDA:
November 2000, as the statute provides.
LYNDA also argues [pp. 21-22 of her BRIEF] that the
duration of time that the "modification" proceeding
took should be held against ALAN, as the moving party.
LYNDA'S observations and arguments on this point are
disingenuous and misleading, for a number of reasons.
1.

LYNDA'S arguments ignore the fact that

given

the

obvious

"material

change

of

circumstance", she has resisted even up to the
date of trial before the District Court, any
"modification" whatsoever. Notwithstanding her
$50,000

annual

dependents,

and

salary,
similar

good

health,

factors

no

arguably

pertinent to an "alimony" analysis on "her
side" of the alimony equation and disregarding
ALAN'S hospitalization, diminished earning
capacity,

inability

to

find

employment
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commensurate with his skills, and so forth,
LYNDA continued "hold out" for the entire
$16,800 annual amount originally decreed when
ALAN'S income (and/or "earning capacity") was
significantly many times what it presently is.
2.

Not only did LYNDA procedurally resist

the "modification" and assumed a hard-line,
stonewall stance vis-a-vis the "modification"
and now-conceded (by her, but only after the
District

Court

has

so

"found")

"material

change of circumstances", but in her obviously
superior economic and health position, she
filed numerous

"show cause" petitions for

"orders to show cause" for judgments for
unpaid

alimony.

Such

had

the

effect

of

diverting what precious little resources ALAN
did have for the litigation effort from the
main proceeding of his choosing; LYNDA is in
no position to complain as to the length of
time the "modification" proceeding actually
took. Likewise, any perceived "delay" in the
proceedings arguably worked in favor of LYNDA:
over time, ALAN'S continuing efforts to better
his financial position by seeking employment
(albeit

in

Montana)

which

was

more
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commensurate and rewarding economically with
his skills may have been successful, and she
would

arguably

have

reaped

the

benefit

thereof. Similarly, she has been unable to
identify

any economic

or legal

detriment

sustained by reason of such claimed "delay".
3.

Thirdly, the length of time is actually

immaterial
example,

to LYNDA'S
the

adjudicated

case

interests.

were

If, for

instantaneously

in snapshot fashion

by the

District Court in December 2000 based upon the
evidence ultimately available to the District
Court2, the alimony award would still have
been reduced to the $500 monthly amount. That
prospective "judgment" (i.e. "modification")
would effectively operate to deprive her of
any

"post-judgment"

difference

from

amounts

the

$1600

(i.e.
per

the
month

originally). Thus, LYNDA shouldn't have any
basis

for

complaint;

how

long

the

"modification" proceeding actually took to
litigate

with or with any pauses or breaks,

explained

or

not

is

immaterial

to

2

her

ALAN's original BRIEF identifies the potential
dangers in proceeding too quickly in haste to arrive at
a judicial determination.
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interests.
CONCLUSION
The District Court's award of $500 monthly alimony
was improperly adjudicated against ALAN: not upon the
statutory criteria (her "needs" as contrasted with her
"wants" and/or as described as her "expenses"; her
presently-manifested her ability to provide for her own
support; and his own inability to provide support,
particularly

in

the

inequitably-excessive

amounts

dictated by the Court), but rather from the Court's
misanalysis of the situation at hand. Not only did the
District Court "abuse its discretion" in effecting the
award (by ignoring those criteria and/or by overlooking
the evidence, in the Court's zeal to concentrate upon
the "obligation"), but the Court has implemented a
truly "inequitable" result which is readily apparent.
The District Court's continuing, myopic focus upon
ALAN'S "obligation"
Court
economic

which is not the issue before the

to the seeming exclusion of examining LYNDA'S
situation

(i.e. actual

need,

ability

to

support self, and so forth) , including the lack of any
specific findings and analysis the specific impact upon
the parties themselves, is an abuse of discretion and
cannot support the inequitable alimony award. The $500
per month is facially "inequitable", given the evidence
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

before the Court.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of January,
2005.
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